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The Cyprus conflict has consequences not only for the 
Cypriots but also for the international community. Af-
ter the Annan Plan, the EU has become involved in the 
resolution of this conflict. Endeavouring to encourage 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots to produce a quick solution, 
the EU advocated that the Cyprus problem should not 
hinder the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the 
EU. However, in 2004 75.83% of Greek Cypriot commu-
nity voted against the Annan Plan. Even if Turkish Cypri-
ots supported the Annan Plan (64.90%), the Republic of 
Cyprus entered the EU representing the whole island. 
The European Commission reacted by agreeing to ‘re-
ward’ Turkish Cypriot community’s ‘yes’ by a financial as-
sistance package, easing trade between the two sides, 
lifting the isolations on Turkish Cypriots, and helping 
the Cypriots to solve the conflict. However, it has faced 
major difficulties in implementing these policies. 
Developments in EU’s 
policies in Northern Cyprus
The Green Line separates the island into two, where 
northern side of the line is referred as being ‘non-gov-
ernment controlled areas’. The Green Line Regulation 
of 2004 on movement of persons and goods across 
the line has aimed to foster Turkish Cypriot trade and 
encourage reunification. Although the regulation pro-
vides a legal framework for Cypriots crossing the line, 
it brought with it problems of illegal migration from 
the northern side to the southern side of the island. 
As per European Commission reports, the amount of 
intra-trade has remained marginal due to the refusal of 
Greek Cypriots to buy Turkish Cypriot products. Intra-
trade continues to decrease along with crossings.
Isolations imposed on Turkish Cypriots cover the re-
strictions towards direct trade, direct travel links, and 
participation in international social and cultural events 
such as international sport events and ERASMUS pro-
gram. Lifting the isolations would show that the EU is 
earnest in its claim for supporting a federal partnership 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Given 
that Turkish Cypriots showed clear support for reunifi-
cation in 2004, the EU should help them improve their 
capacity for handling possible reunification as well as 
European integration. The veto of the Republic of Cy-
prus in the Council of Ministers however prevented 
the EU to implement its 2004 promise of lifting the 
isolations until December 2009. After the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force and the issue of direct trade was con-
sidered eligible for discussions under the co-decision 
procedure, the EU, as a result of effective Greek Cyp-
riot lobbying, discussed the issue in the Legal Affairs 
Council of the European Parliament and decided that 
it could not be treated as any other trade deal with a 
third country. Thus, direct trade regulation was once 
again put on hold. 
Turkish Cypriots still suffer from a lack of contact with 
the outside world, including the EU. One of the most 
evident institutional consequences of the status quo 
is that even though the Turkish Cypriots are citizens of 
the Republic of Cyprus, all six members of the European 
Parliament from Cyprus are Greek Cypriots and Turkish, 
which is an official language of the Republic of Cyprus, 
is not an official language of the EU. To assure fair repre-
sentation of EU citizens in EU institutions, the Republic 
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of Cyprus should consider proposing Turkish as an offi-
cial EU language. Even if the EU has not mentioned the 
issue during accession negotiations, it can include the 
language issue within its efforts of lifting the isolations 
on Turkish Cypriots.
At first, there were restrictions to the financial aid pro-
gram of the EU as the former president Papadopoulos 
sued the EU with six different cases in order to block aid 
to the Turkish Cypriot community. However, four failed 
cases in the European Court of Justice became an im-
petus for succeeding president Christofias to withdraw 
the remaining two cases from the Court. The EU cre-
ated a budget of EUR 259 million for the Turkish Cyp-
riot community to be spent on various projects such 
as infrastructure development, civil society capacity 
building, and scholarship program. The entire amount 
could not be spent due to the initial Greek Cypriot ob-
struction. Nevertheless, despite various obstacles for 
successful implementation, a number of important and 
beneficial projects mentioned in Turkish Cypriot media 
have improved Turkish Cypriots’ trust in the EU.
Since the Republic of Cyprus is a full member of the EU, 
the EU is reluctant to pressure the Republic of Cyprus 
for a solution. Moreover, there is also a lack of common 
stance on the Cypriot issue. Whereas members like the 
UK and Sweden emerge as fairly supportive of Turkish 
Cypriots, France and Germany openly side with Greek 
Cypriot administration. Thus, the EU’s support for the 
negotiations has most of the time remained only with 
rhetoric. 
Consequences of Failed Policies 
Although Turkish Cypriots are EU citizens, Turkish Re-
public of Northern Cyprus is a de facto state that is 
not part of the EU but is highly influenced by the EU. 
Hence, the policy of the EU towards the Turkish Cypriot 
community provides an example of the EU’s structur-
al foreign policy. In this special case, the EU attempts 
to change and create various structures in the Turkish 
Cypriot community to prepare the Turkish Cypriots for 
full membership under a unified country by strength-
ening civil society, boosting democratization, liberaliza-
tion, and economic well being. Furthermore, it intends 
to contribute to elimination of economic disparities 
that exist between the two communities. 
However, the EU’s structural foreign policy towards Turk-
ish Cypriots does not emerge as a success story. The EU 
has not been effective when it comes to supporting ne-
gotiations for a solution. The Green Line Regulation has 
only had a trivial effect. The state of isolations on Turk-
ish Cypriots has only changed minimally. The financial 
aid regulation on the other hand has somewhat suc-
ceeded in developing the northern part of the island 
and influencing the Turkish Cypriots’ attitudes towards 
the EU. In overall though, promises that could not be 
kept and the slow pace of progress may have caused 
Turkish Cypriots to lose faith in Europe. This may be one 
of the reasons why in the last elections Turkish Cypriots 
shifted back to the ethnocentric, nationalist and euro-
skeptic National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi). 
Figure 1 – Trust in the European Union in Percentage (Eurobarometer)
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Figure 1 illustrating the Turkish Cypriots’ trust in the EU 
clearly shows a matter of concern for the success of the 
EU’s structural foreign policy towards Turkish Cypriots. 
Apart from the early 2008 datum, Turkish Cypriots’ trust 
in the EU shows a lower average than that of the EU 
average and mainly declining trends since late 2005. 
The Way Forward
Turkish Cypriots are citizens of the EU as individuals 
even if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not 
recognized by the EU and the European laws are not 
applied in the northern part of the island. Any demo-
cratic polity acquires its legitimacy from its citizens. If 
the EU desires to gain Turkish Cypriots’ trust, it needs to 
be proactive with the goal of implementing the direct 
trade regulation, opening the Ercan airport to interna-
tional flights, and lifting cultural and sport embargoes 
on Turkish Cypriots. The possibility of Turkish becoming 
an official language of the EU should also be considered 
by negotiating this matter with the current President 
Christofias who is known to be positive towards Turkish 
Cypriots compared with many other Greek Cypriot poli-
ticians. Finally, the European Commission should make 
intensive and objective efforts towards finding a solu-
tion to the Cyprus problem to enhance the representa-
tion of Turkish Cypriots in EU institutions.
